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Using the False Claims Act as a Basis for Institutional
Review Board Liability
Daniel J. Powellt
In recent years, several major incidents involving human subjects
research, two involving the death of the subject, have shaken confi-
dence in the protections afforded human subjects of biomedical re-
search.' For instance, officials at Johns Hopkins University were re-
cently chastised by a state court for allegedly exposing children to po-
tentially harmful lead-based paint. In two other instances, a New Jer-
sey law firm has filed suit on behalf of the subjects In addition to
naming the research institution and the researcher as defendants,
these plaintiffs took the highly unusual step of suing the Institutional
Review Board ("IRB"), a peer-review board that studied the safety
and efficacy of the proposed research program and was responsible
for approving it for federal funding. While there is some precedent
for this type of suit,' the theories on which such a suit could be predi-
cated have not been fully discussed or explored, as few suits against an
• 6
IRB have ever gone to trial.
The most straightforward suit is, of course, a tort suit alleging
negligence on the part of the IRB in approving the research protocol.
Other theories of liability have been pursued, including allegations of
infringements of constitutional rights and violations of the federal
laws and regulations governing the proper conduct of federally funded
research involving human participants. This Comment argues that
t A.B. 2000, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2003, The University of Chicago.
1 Michael D. Lemonick and Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk, Time 46 (Apr 22,2002)
(describing several research studies and the public perception surrounding clinical trials).
2 See text accompanying notes 43-46.
3 The complaints are available online at <httpJ/www.sskrplaw.com/gene> (visited Dec 10,
2001).
4 Id.
5 Mary R. Anderlink and Nanette EIster, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Lawsuits
Against IRBs:Accountability or Incongruity?, 29 J L Med & Ethics 220,224 & n 54 (2001) (citing
the complaint filed in Robertson v McGee, No 01CU0060HCM (N D Okla 2001); Kus v Sherman
Hospital, 268 Ill App 3d 771,644 NE2d 1214,1216 (1995) (involving a suit against an IRB for fail-
ing to monitor whether a physician was obtaining proper informed consent from his patients,
who were subjects in an experiment).
6 Robert J. Katerberg, Institutional Review Boards, Research on Children, and Informed
Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between Encouraging Vital Experimentation and Pro-
tecting Subjects' Rights, 24 J Coil & Univ L 545, 574 n 156 (1998) (finding only two cases in the
literature, neither of which was reported).
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plaintiffs have another tool at their disposal: the federal False Claims
Act ("FCA")..
The FCA is increasingly being deployed, both by the government
and private individuals, to enforce regulatory requirements in other
areas of health care law, most notably Medicare reimbursement regu-
lations and fraud and abuse laws.8 Although suits against IRBs have
not alleged a cause of action under the FCA, at least one commenta-
tor has suggested the possibility. In addition, while no decisions have
been reached on the merits, two suits have alleged a violation of the
FCA for the failure of a university to adhere to the federal regulations
governing human subjects research.9
This Comment discusses the FCA in relation to suits against
IRBs. Part I explains the regulatory framework within which IRBs
must operate, as well as the structure of the human subject protection
system. This Part also describes several of the most recent incidents
involving human subjects research in the United States. Part II pro-
vides an overview of the essential elements of a suit under the FCA,
focusing upon the application of the FCA to fraud and abuse laws,
which provide the closest analogy to IRB regulations and present
similar issues. Finally, Part III suggests that as a matter of both law and
policy, courts should allow FCA claims against the IRB in very limited
circumstances, using the four cases from Part I to illustrate the appli-
cation of the suggested interpretations. Part III will also include a dis-
cussion of the limited instances in which the suits might be useful in
strengthening the human subjects protection system.
I. HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part examines the current environment in which an FCA
suit against an IRB would be brought. Part L.A provides background
on the human research protection system in place in the United States
and focuses on provisions found in the federal regulations, with which
compliance is required to receive federal funding. Part I.B discusses
7 31 USC §§ 3729-33 (1994 & Supp 2001).
8 Government statistics show that in 1987, 12 percent of all qui tam actions involved a
program operated through the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the de-
partment responsible for administering many health care laws and programs. Pamela H. Bucy,
Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 Ala L Rev 57, 58
(1999). By 1998, however, that number had increased to 61 percent. Id.
9 Zissler v Regents of the University of Minnesota, 154 F3d 870,871 (8th Cir 1998) (noting
that the plaintiff brought an FCA claim against the defendant hospital for false and misleading
statements in administering a federal grant); Chandler v Hektoen Institute for Medical Research,
35 F Supp 2d 1078, 1079-80 (N D I1 1999) (explaining that the plaintiff brought an FCA claim
against the defendant hospital for failing to comply with federal grant requirements and misrep-
resenting its progress).
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several clinical research trials in which the human subject regulations
described in Part L.A were apparently violated.
A. Regulatory Framework
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act,'° which
overhauled the system of protection for human subjects enrolled in
biomedical and behavioral research. The provision that had the great-
est effect was the requirement that all federally funded research re-
ceive IRB approval." Largely as a result of this law, most institutions
that conduct federally funded research now have an IRB, which is
composed of at least five members 2 and must include at least one sci-
entific member, one member who is primarily concerned with nonsci-
entific issues, and one member who is not affiliated with the research
institution.'3
Pursuant to the National Research Act, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") has established an elaborate system for
approving federally funded research. Under this system, the Office of
Human Research Protections ("OHRP") is charged with developing
and ensuring compliance with HHS regulations, as well as negotiating
assurances with institutions conducting human subjects research."'
OHRP requires these assurances, called Federal Wide Assurances
("FWAs"), before it will allow an IRB to review any human subjects
research.'" These assurances memorialize an institution's commitment
to protecting human subjects.'6 By signing a FWA, an institution agrees
that all research performed in the institution will adhere to The Bel-
mont Report7 or a similar statement of ethical principles.'8 Further-
10 Pub L No 93-348,88 Stat 342, codified at 42 USC §§ 289-300aaa-13 (1994).
11 42 USC § 289(a).
12 45 CFR § 46.107(a) (2000).
13 45 CFR § 46.107(c)-(d).
14 65 Fed Reg 37136-37 (2000). Until June 2000, the Office of Protection from Research
Risks ("OPRR"), a department within the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), oversaw the
system created by the Federal Regulations and had substantially the same authority as OHRF.
Id; Medical Research: Edward Greg Koski Selected to Head New Office for Protection of Human
Subjects, BNA Health Care Daily D15 (June 7, 2001). Even where incidents occurred before
OPRR was changed to OHRP, the Comment will refer to OHRP for consistency.
15 The FWA replaces the Multiple Project Assurance and the Single Project Assurance, ei-
ther of which was required to conduct federally funded human subjects research prior to 2001.
HI-IS, IRB Registration and Insurance Filing Procedures: General Information, available online at
<http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/refnfo.htm#WHAT> (visited Mar 20,
2002).
16 Id.
17 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research ("Commission") was charged with developing ethical guidelines for human
subjects research. The Commission did so in what has become the foundation of modem bio-
ethical principles and the document responsible for many of the protections currently in place
regarding human subjects research, The Belmont ReporL" Ethical Principles and Guidelines for
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more, it agrees to submit all federally funded research to an IRB and
assures that such research will adhere to federal guidelines. 9 If OHRP
finds that a particular researcher or the IRB has not adhered to the
federal guidelines, it may: limit the types of research protocols that the
FWA covers; revoke the FWA; or recommend that an individual re-
searcher, or a research institution, be temporarily or permanently for-
bidden from conducting research involving human subjects.20
HHS has issued regulations governing research involving human
subjects, the so-called Common Rule.2' The focus of the Common Rule
is the IRB, which is primarily charged with balancing the risks and
benefits of the research, ensuring an equitable selection of subjects,
and obtaining valid informed consent of the human participants." The
IRB must also continually review research protocols to ensure that
they are in compliance with federal regulations= and may suspend or
terminate its approval of the research if there has been unanticipated
harm to subjects or if the researcher is failing to abide by the Com-
mon Rule." In many ways the IRB is the linchpin of the federal system
for protecting human subjects. As a committee charged in part with
examining the system of human subjects research put it: "[T]he IRB is
the enforcing agent of federal protections that is situated closest to the
conduct of research. Much of the success or failure of the federal regu-
lations governing human research depends on the effectiveness of
IRBs in carrying out their responsibilities."2'
the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, DHEW Pub No (OS) 78-0012 (GPO 1978).
18 HHS, Federalwide Assurance of Protection for Human Subjects for Domestic (US) Insti-
tutions, available online at <http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/filasur.htm>
(visited Mar 20, 2001) (noting in the "Statement of Principles" section that another document
containing guiding principles might be acceptable).
19 Id.
20 Robert Fabrikant, et al, Health Care Fraud: Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Law
§ 2.04 (discussing the process of applying for and receiving federal research funds), available on
Westlaw at HTHCRFRD § 2.04.
21 45 CFR § 46 (2000). In actuality, each department of the federal government has sepa-
rately adopted the Common Rule, so it appears numerous times in the CFR. See 56 Fed Reg
28012 (1991) for a listing of the applicable sections for each department. The Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), however, has not adopted the Common Rule and operates under a
slightly different set of regulations. See 21 CFR § 50 (2001). There are a few substantive differ-
ences between the Common Rule and the FDA regulations, but none matter for the purposes of
this Comment. Therefore, this Comment will use the terms "Common Rule" and "federal regula-
tions" interchangeably.
22 45CFR§46.111.
23 45 CFR § 46.109(e).
24 45 CFR § 46.113.
25 Ruth R. Fadin, et al, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Ex-
periments (ACHRE) 430 (Oxford 1996).
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B. Recent Research Mishaps
Four recent cases, two of which involved the death of a human
subject, have sharpened the focus on the activities of IRBs in approv-
ing research. In three of those instances, OHRP has established that
federal guidelines were violated, and it is still investigating the fourth.
1. The Gelsinger case.
On September 17, 1999, eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died
while in a gene therapy trial sponsored by the University of Pennsyl-
vania.26 Although Gelsinger had a form of the disease being treated, he
was not expected to benefit from the treatment itself, which focused
on examining the efficacy of a treatment that might eventually be
used on babies with a fatal form of the disease. ' In an investigation
following Gelsinger's death, officials concluded that Gelsinger did not
meet the criteria for participating in the study and should never have
been enrolled .2 Officials also concluded that adverse events were not
immediately reported to the IRB in violation of the federal regula-
tions.' Perhaps most importantly, the lead investigator had a conflict
of interest that was never disclosed to the patient.3 Although
Gelsinger's family initially supported the actions of those involved,
31
they eventually filed suit against the university.2
2. The Robertson case.
Another high-profile case occurred in 2000 at the University of
Oklahoma Health Sciences Center-Tulsa. A nurse familiar with the
particulars of an ongoing cancer vaccine trial alleged numerous devia-
tions from the federal regulations in that study.33 OHRP confirmed
these allegations, finding that the chair of the IRB unilaterally ap-
proved retroactive changes in the research protocol, rather than ob-
26 Nicholas Wade, Death Leads to Concerns for Future of Gene Therapy, NY Tunes A22
(Sept 30,1999).
27 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, FDA Officials Fault Penn Team in Gene Therapy Death, NY Times
A22 (Dec 9,1999).
2 Id.
29 Id.
30 Jennifer Washburn, Informed Consent. Alan Milstein Says He Wants to Rescue Us from
Unscrupulous Doctors, Undisclosed Risks and Greedy Institutions. But Is He a Shining Knight, or
an Enemy of Medical Progress?, Wash Post Mag W16 (Dec 30,2001) (noting that the lead inves-
tigator had entered into a relationship with a biotechnology company-in which he also held
stock-that agreed to fund 20 percent of annual research costs in exchange for the right to de-
velop commercial uses of the investigator's research).
31 Stolberg, FDA Officials at A22 (cited in note 27).
32 Anderlink and Elster, 29 J L Med & Ethics at 220 (cited in note 5).
33 Id at 221.
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taining the vote of the full IRB.3 OHRP also found that the require-
ment of continuing review was satisfied for very few of the protocols
and that the board lacked sufficient information to make the required
findings to protect vulnerable populations, maintain privacy and con-
fidentiality, and ensure the equitable selection of subjects.-5 As a result
of these findings, OHRP shut down the research trial." Several pa-
tients subsequently filed suit against those involved, including mem-
bers of the IRB." In their complaint (containing 122 causes of action),
the plaintiffs alleged that the IRB violated their right to dignity and
other civil rights, failed to adhere to the federal regulations, and be-
haved negligently in the conduct of the research trial.3
3. The Ellen Roche case.
In the summer of 2001, Johns Hopkins University was the subject
of an OHRP investigation after Ellen Roche, a healthy, twenty-four-
year-old volunteer, died from her participation in an asthma study.9 In
addition to faulting the researcher for inadequately researching the
drug used in the study,' OHRP cited the Hopkins IRB for significant
violations of the federal regulations. Specifically, the IRB failed to ob-
tain adequate information to evaluate the risks of the research proto-
col, did not sufficiently review ongoing research, failed to fully con-
sider the needs of vulnerable subjects, and kept insufficient records of
its meetings.4' As a result of these violations, OHRP terminated all
34 See 45 CFR § 46.109(a) (requiring IRB approval of all research activities covered by the
federal regulations).
35 Anderlink and Elster, 29 J L Med & Ethics at 221 (cited in note 5).
36 Id.
37 Chad Bowman, Professional Liability: Subjects in Halted Melanoma Trial Sue Institu-
tional Review Board, Others, BNA Health Care Daily Report d7 (Feb 2,2001).
38 First Amended Complaint, Robertson v McGee, available online at <http://www.
sskrplaw.com/gene/robertson/complaint-new.html> (visited Mar 21, 2000).
39 Associated Press, Report on a Research Death Faults Review Board, NY Times A16 (Aug
31,2001).
40 Letter from Patrick J. McNeiily, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, Division of Com-
pliance Oversight, HHS, and Michael Carome, Director, Division of Compliance Oversight,
HHS, to Edward Miller, Dean and Chief Execuitive Officer, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Chi Van
Dang, Vice Dean for Research, The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and Gregory
F Schaffer, President, The Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, July 19, 2001, available
online at <http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm-letrs/ul0la.pdf> (visited Mar 21, 2002). It appears
that previous versions of textbooks had indicated that the drug used to induce asthma was toxic
in humans, and that a more exhaustive review of the literature would have revealed that the re-
search protocol should have been modified. Letter from Chi Van Dang, Vice Dean for Research,
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and Gregory E Schaffer, President, Johns Hop-
kins Bayview Medical Center, to Michael Carome, Division of Compliance Oversight, OHRP,
July 13, 2001, available online at <http://www.sunspot.net/bal-hopkinsletters.htmlstory> (visited
Feb 7,2002).
41 Letter from Patrick J. McNeilly (cited in note 40).
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federally funded research at Hopkins for several days while officials at
Hopkins formulated a plan to address OHRP's concerns.2
4. The Grimes case.
More recently, a lawsuit was filed in response to another incident
at Johns Hopkins, this time involving research aimed at determining
the effect of partial lead abatement procedures.4 3 Despite knowing
that such exposure could be dangerous, researchers encouraged land-
lords participating in the study to rent to families with young children
and periodically measured the lead content in the blood of children
who lived in the study houses, comparing it to the amount of lead dust
in the home." Furthermore, it appears that the IRB did not require the
researchers to obtain informed consent, and suggested word modifica-
tions in the research protocol that would hide the fact that children
were acting as a control group, a practice discouraged by the federal
regulations." Based on these facts, the Maryland Court of Appeals
overruled a Maryland district court and held that the plaintiffs stated
a cause of action. After their decision was handed down, OHRP initi-
ated an investigation of the research.4
II. THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Before evaluating these cases under the FCA, an examination of
the FCA itself is warranted. Part II.A provides a general overview of
the FCA, including its history as well as the required elements of a
successful suit. Part I.B discusses the application of the FCA to fraud
and abuse laws in the health care field as well as issues such applica-
tions of the FCA have raised, many of which arise in the context of
IRBs. Part HI will address the resolution of those issues in that con-
text.
42 Associated Press, Report on a Research Death at A16 (cited in note 39).
43 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc, 366 Md 29, 782 A2d 807, 858 (Md App 2001)
(holding that a legal guardian "cannot consent to the participation of a child or other person un-
der legal disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or
damage to the health of the subject").
44 Id at 812.
45 Id at 813-14.
46 Tamar Lewin, US Investigating Johns Hopkins Study of Lead Paint Hazard, NY Times
All (Aug 24,2001). If the research does not present the prospect of direct benefit to the child,
the Federal Regulations require the IRB to make additional findings, and limit the risk to the
subjects. Compare 45 CFR § 46.405 and § 46.406.
47 Although there are many fraud and abuse laws other than the FCA that are often ap-
plied in the healthcare context, this Comment will focus on the Anti-Kickback law, 42 USC
§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B) (1994), and the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (the "Stark law"), 42 USC
§ 1395rn (1994), in particular.
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A. Overview of the FCA
1. What constitutes a fraudulent claim.
The FCA was passed in 1863 to combat rampant fraud in civil
war defense contracts.' It provides for civil damages against any per-
son who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or ap-
proved by the Government." 9 These damages are measured at three
times the amount of the false claim (or two times the amount if the
defendant cooperates with the government) plus not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000 per false claim submitted Finally, in addi-
tion to a suit brought by the government," a private citizen, or relator,
can bring a qui tam action on behalf of the federal government. 2 Gen-
erally, the relator is entitled to 15-25 percent of the damages if the
government intervenes 3 and 25-30 percent of the damages if the gov-
ernment does not.m
When alleging a violation of the FCA, the prosecutor or relator
must show that (1) the defendant submitted or caused to be submitted
a claim for payment to the federal government; (2) the claim was false
or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that
the claim was false. In addition, some courts require that the gov-
ernment suffer pecuniary loss as a result of the claim, although this
criterion is not universally required."
2. Scienter.
In order to bring a qui tam action, the relator must show that the
defendant knew or should have known that he was submitting a false
claim or making a false statement in support of a claim being filed
with the federal government.57 It is important to note, however, that no
intent actually to defraud the government is required; the scienter re-
48 False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess (1986), re-
printed in 1986 USCCAN 5266-5303.
49 31 USC § 3729(a)(2). The FCA also provides for other causes of action. For present pur-
poses, the other relevant subsection is 31 USC § 3729(a)(1) (providing that "anyone who know-
ingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Gov-
ernment ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" is liable to the government).
50 31 USC § 3729(a)(7).
51 31 USC § 3730(a) (Supp 2001).
52 31USC § 3730(b).
53 31 USC § 3730(d)(1).
54 31 USC § 3730(d)(2).
55 31 USC § 3729(b); John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions, § 2.01[A] at
2-8 (Aspen 2d ed 2001).
56 Pogue v American Healthcorp, Inc, 914 F Supp 1507, 1508-09 (M D Tenn 1996) ("Pogue
") (noting the conflict between courts on the issues of actual damages).
57 31 USC § 3729(a)(1).
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quirement only applies to whether the information given to the gov-
ernment is false.-
In addition, the statute was amended in 1986 to clarify the defini-
tion of "knowingly" to include not only actual knowledge but also
claims filed in deliberate ignorance or with reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information.5 Thus, an individual cannot use the
so-called "ostrich" defense and must "make a reasonable and pru-
dent" inquiry to ensure the claim is accurate.4 What this includes,
however, is unclear on the face of the statute, and subsequent case law
has not made that standard any clearer. The seminal case on the mat-
ter is United States v Krizek,' in which the government challenged the
defendant psychiatrist's billing practices.62 The court noted that the
billing practice lacked any centralization or control, so that in many
instances duplicate bills were submitted, many of the bills had little or
no factual support, and the psychiatrist frequently failed to review the
claims submitted by his wife on his behalf6 As a result, even though
there was no evidence that the defendant knowingly submitted false
claims, the court upheld a finding that the defendant was reckless and
therefore liable under the Act." As in this case, courts commonly find
recklessness when the defendant did not have a sufficient factual basis
to support the claim and when a proper investigation was not per-
formed,4 as well as in instances in which the individual misunderstood
the relevant regulations but the court finds that he should have under-
stood them."
3. Measure of damages.
Courts are split as to whether the relator or prosecution must
show that the government actually suffered pecuniary damages to
bring a suit under the FCA.67 The statute provides a penalty of "three
5s 31 USC § 3729(b). See, for example, Peterson v Weinberger, 508 F2d 45,54 (5th Cir 1975)
(holding a doctor liable for depositing Medicare reimbursements for claims that he did not file);
United States v Aerodex, Inc, 469 F2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir 1973) (allowing a suit against a defen-
dant who relabeled 300 master rod bearings to fill a government order even though the substi-
tuted bearings were interchangeable with those specified by the contract).
59 31 USC § 3729(b).
60 S Rep No 99-345 at 5285-86 (cited in note 48).
61 Ill F3d 934 (DC Cir 1997).
62 Id at 935.
63 Id at 942.
64 Id.
65 See, for example, United States v Raymond & Whitecomb Co, 53 F Supp 2d 436,446 (S D
NY 1999) (noting that failure to investigate can be enough to prove recklessness).
66 United States v Mackby, 261 F3d 821, 828 (9th Cir 2001) ("Participants in the Medicare
program have a duty to familiarize themselves with the legal requirements for payment").
67 Harrison v Westinghouse Savannah River Co, 176 F3d 776,785 n 7 (4th Cir 1999) (noting
the conflict among courts on the issue of actual damages); Pogue 1, 914 F Supp at 1508-09.
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times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because
of the act" of the defendant. This has led some to argue that actual
damages are required in order to bring suit under the FCA. Neverthe-
less, in 1956 the Supreme Court held in Rex Trailer Co, Inc v United
States that "there is no requirement, statutory or judicial, that specific
damages be shown."69 The Court noted, however, that the government
suffered an injury, even if it was impossible to quantify.70 Courts have
subsequently held that "damages" must not be limited to a net loss to
the government; for instance, courts have found that paying a claim
sooner than it was rightfully due7 ' and paying a claim to an improper
beneficiary 7 constitute damages for purposes of the FCA. Some
courts, however, in seeming contradiction to Rex Trailer, have held
that the plaintiff must show damages in order to recover under the
FCA.7 Nevertheless, the clear weight of authority suggests that the de-
fendant does not have to show actual damages to the government.
68 31 USC § 3729(a) (Supp 2001).
69 350 US 148,152 (1956).
70 Id at 153 ("It is obvious that injury to the Government resulted from the Rex Trailer
Company's fraudulent purchase of trucks. It precluded bona fide sales to veterans, decreased the
number of motor vehicles available to Government agencies, and tended to promote undesirable
speculation.").
71 Young-Montenay, Inc v United States, 15 F3d 1040,1043 (Fed Cir 1994). Although the de-
fendant in that case argued that the only damages that should have been allowed were the inter-
est payments the government could have received if it had paid the claim at the proper time, the
court found the defendant liable for the entire amount of the false claim. Id at 1043 n 3.
72 See, for example, Peterson, 508 F2d at 52-54 (holding a physician liable under the FCA
for submitting claims for services that were in actuality performed by his brother's physical ther-
apy corporation).
73 Wilkins v Ohio, 885 F Supp 1055, 1060 (S D Ohio 1995) ("[W]hile § 3729(a) authorizes
recovery of any damages sustained by the United States upon proof of those damages by the
plaintiff, no damages need be proved in order to recover the civil penalty of $5,000 specified in
that section."); Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamonte, PA v Provident Life & Accident Insurance
Co, 721 F Supp 1247, 1258-59 (S D Fla 1989) (stating that the FCA requires that the government
suffer damages as a result of the submission of a false or fraudulent claim); Blusal Meats, Inc v
United States, 638 F Supp 824, 827 (S D NY 1986) (noting that a statutory fine was available if
the government could not prove damages).
74 See, for example. Hagood v Sonoma Co Water Agency, 929 F2d 1416,1421 (9th Cir 1991)
("A civil penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000, and the costs of the civil action, are also recov-
erable under the statute, 31 USC § 3729(a). No damages need be shown in order to recover the
penalty."); Pogue 1, 914 F Supp at 1508-09 ("While there is clearly some disagreement among the
courts regarding this issue, this Court cannot ignore the decision of the Supreme Court in Rex
Trailer."); United States v Kensington Hospital, 760 F Supp 1120, 1127 (E D Pa 1991) ("Control-
ling Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedents hold that the government need not show actual
damage in order to prove a violation of the False Claims Act."). See also James B. Helmer, Jr.,
Paul B. Martins, and Julie W. Popham, Recovery of Damages under the False Claims Act,
N98CFCB, ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education C-2-C-3 (Nov 19-20,1998) (noting that
"overwhelming authority holds that a viable False Claims Act action may exist without proof of
actual damages").
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4. Jurisdictional issues.
In many actions brought under the qui tam provisions of the
FCA, the court must also determine whether the relator is relying on
publicly disclosed information to bring the suit.75 If it concludes that
the information upon which the relator is basing his action was pub-
licly available, the court loses jurisdiction over the action.7 The ration-
ale for this requirement is clear: the government allows qui tam suits
to be brought because insiders generally have more information about
fraudulent claims than a prosecutor would." f however, the informa-
tion is publicly available, the government does not need the relator to
bring the suit, since it could bring it on its own and recover the full
amount of the loss.
a) Information must be publicly available. It is unclear what stan-
dard of information is sufficient to deprive a court of jurisdiction over
a qui tam suit. Courts generally note a difference between the disclo-
sure of mere information and the disclosure of "allegations or transac-
tions." What constitutes an allegation or transaction, however, is not
well defined. Generally, to find that they lack jurisdiction, courts re-
quire that either the allegation of fraud itself or all of the critical ele-
79
ments of the fraud must be contained in the public materials For ex-
ample, in Pogue v American Healthcorp, Inc ("Pogue IF) the court
ruled that while the information that formed the basis of the claim
was gathered from documents filed with the SEC, newspaper reports,
and other publicly available sources,8 there was insufficient informa-
tion in these sources to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.' Even though the defendant argued that the facts necessary to
show that the Anti-Kickback law was violated could reasonably be
75 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994).
76 Id (denying jurisdiction to a qui tam claim "based upon the public disclosure of allega-
tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administra-
tive, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the ... person bringing the action is an original source of the information").
77 Springfield Terminal Railway Co v Quinn, 14 F3d 645,649-51 (DC Cir 1994) (discussing
the rationale behind allowing qui tam actions).
78 See, for example, Wang v FMC Corp, 975 F2d 1412,1418 (9th Cir 1992) ("Courts some-
times speak loosely of barring a qui tam suit because it is based on 'publicly disclosed informa-
tion' ... . But the Act bars suits based on publicly disclosed 'allegations or transactions,' not in-
formation.") (citations omitted).
79 Springfield Terminal, 14 F3d at 654 (stating that the court believes that Congress, by its
careful choice of terminology in the 1986 amendments, created "a standard under which qui tam
actions are barred only when enough information exists in the public domain to expose the
fraudulent transaction ... or the allegation of fraud," since if either is true, the government does
not need the relator in order to bring suit).
80 977 F Supp 1329,1335-37 (M D Ten 1997).
81 Id at 1338-39.
82 See text accompanying notes 90-92.
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inferred from the available information, the court nevertheless al-
lowed the action to proceed.3
b) The original source exception. Although courts are ordinarily
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that is based on
publicly available information, the FCA makes an exception for in-
stances in which the relator is an "original source of the information.""
An original source is defined as "an individual who has direct and in-
dependent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern-
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on in-
formation."' Thus, when an individual provides information to the
government, but the government does not subsequently bring suit, the
individual is not barred from doing so herself even though the gov-
ernment possesses the information. To bring suit, the putative relator
must have direct and independent knowledge of the information, a
requirement that would not be satisfied "where one would not have
learned of the information but for its public disclosure."''
B. Application of the FCA to Fraud and Abuse Laws
The reach of the FCA is nowhere more striking than in the recent
decisions using violations of health care fraud and abuse laws as the
basis for qui tam actions.8 In addition to bringing suit under the myr-
iad of regulations governing Medicare and Medicaid, individuals and
the government have brought suit under two laws: the Anti-Kickback
law"'and the Stark law.'
83 Pogue II, 977 F Supp at 1339-40. See also Cooper v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Flor-
ida, Inc, 19 F3d 562, 567 (11th Cir 1994) (per curiam) (concluding that a GAO report criticizing
defendant for a failure to monitor payments, possibly implicating a conflict of interest, was not
sufficient to raise the jurisdictional bar since the report did not actually allege that the defendant
was guilty of any wrongdoing); Schwedt v Planning Research Corp, Inc, 39 F Supp 2d 28, 33 (D
DC 1999) (holding that the public disclosure of errors and incompleteness in delivery to the gov-
ernment was sufficient to deprive the court of jurisdiction). For a general discussion, see Robert
Salcido, Screening out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the Public Dis-
closure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions under the False Claims Act, 24 Pub Con L J 237
(1995) (concluding that courts originally construed the bar too narrowly, but that now they con-
strue it properly).
84 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
85 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(B).
86 Wang, 975 F2d at 1417, citing Houck v Folding Carton Administration Committee, 881
F2d 494,505 (7th Cir 1989).
87 See generally Robert N. Rabecs, Kickbacks as False Claims: The Use of the Civil False
Claims Act to Prosecute Violations of the Federal Health Care Program's Anti-Kickback Statute,
2001 Detroit Coll L Rev 1, 4 (noting that the use of the FCA to prosecute violations of the anti-
kickback statute "greatly expands the application and scope of the False Claims Act").
88 See, for example, Mikes v Straus, 274 F3d 687,693 (2d Cir 2001) (noting plaintiffs claim
that defendants' receipt of referral fees from Medicare for referrals to facilities in which defen-
dants held a financial interest violated the anti-kickback provision of the Medicare statute, 42
USC § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (1994)).
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The Anti-Kickback law holds criminally liable any individual who
pays money to induce another individual to purchase, lease, or rec-
ommend the purchase of any service under Medicare or Medicaid.9
The goal of the law is to prevent hospitals or other organizations from
inducing physicians to give additional referrals to such an entity.9' To
prove a violation of the Anti-Kickback law, the government must
show (a) the requisite scienter (knowingly or willingly), (b) solicita-
tion or remuneration, and (c) that such solicitation or remuneration
was aimed at inducing referrals?9
The Stark law prevents physicians who have a financial interest in
a specified list of entities (for example, a laboratory) from making re-
ferrals to that entity (for example, for a blood test).9 This law was en-
acted to protect against over-referrals by physicians to their own labo-
ratories for personal profit.' Unlike the Anti-Kickback law, the Stark
law is a strict liability statute and only applies to Medicare claims
submitted to the government.'
1. Violation of fraud and abuse laws as a per se violation of
the FCA.
Since neither the Anti-Kickback law nor the Stark law provides
for a private right of action,9 many citizens have brought qui tam ac-
tions under the FCA. Citizens bringing such actions have argued that
89 Thompson v Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 125 F3d 899, 902 (5th Cir 1997) (recog-
nizing that the submission of a false certification of compliance with the Stark law can constitute
a false claim under the FCA); Gublo v NovaCare Inc, 62 F Supp 2d 347,355 (D Mass 1999) (not-
ing that if payment of Medicaid or Medicare claims for services rendered was conditioned on de-
fendant's false certifications and violations of the Stark law, then plaintiffs properly allege a vio-
lation of the FCA).
90 42USC § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B).
91 See 42 CFR § 1001 (2001). Certain transactions are exempted. See 42 CFR § 1001.952.
92 Hanlester Network v Shalala, 51 F3d 1390,1398-1401 (9th Cir 1995).
93 The relevant text of the law provides that if a physician or an immediate family member
has a financial relationship to a specified entity,
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of designated
health services for which payment otherwise may be made under this subchapter, and (B)
the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under this subchapter or bill to
any individual, third party payor, or other entity for designated health services furnished
pursuant to [such a prohibited referral].
42 USC § 1395nn(a)(1)(A)-(B).
94 See Clark C. Havighurst, James F. Blumstein, and Troyen A. Brennan, Health Care Law
and Policy 485-86 (Fountain 2d ed 1998).
95 42 USC § 1395nn(a)(1). See also Anne W. Morrison, An Analysis of Anti-Kickback and
Self-Referral Law in Modem Health Care, 21 J Leg Med 351,375 (2000) (contrasting the liability
standards of the Anti-Kickback and Stark laws).
9 West Allis Memorial Hospita4 Inc v Bowen, 852 F2d 251,255 (7th Cir 1988) (holding that
the Stark law does not provide a private right of action); Donovan v Rothman, 106 F Supp 2d
513, 516 (S D NY 2000) (finding that there is no private cause of action to redress violations of
the anti-kickback statute); Roy v Anthony, 914 F Supp 1504,1506 (S D Ohio 1994) (same).
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since physicians must meet the requirements of the Anti-Kickback
and Stark laws in order to submit a claim for reimbursement under
Medicare, any claim for services rendered in violation of these laws is
fraudulent. Courts have generally been receptive to those arguments.9'
While courts are generally quick to point out that "violations of laws,
rules, or regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the
FCA," those same courts will generally allow such an action to be
brought in the case of the Anti-Kickback and Stark laws.9 Presumably
then, these same courts would permit a claim premised on the viola-
tion of federal regulations governing human subjects research.
2. Establishing the falsity or fraudulent nature of a claim:
implied certification.
While the government would not ordinarily pay for a claim sub-
mitted in violation of fraud and abuse laws, it is often uncertain
whether a particular claim indicates that the individual had complied
with the applicable regulations. If it does not, some have argued, the
claim itself is not false and should not be actionable under the FCA.
This is not to say that the individual should not be punished-fraud
and abuse statutes themselves provide for stiff penalties"-but rather
that the FCA is not the method by which those statutes should be en-
forced.
In response to this argument, some courts have not required an
express statement that the individual requesting funding has complied
with applicable federal regulations. Beginning with Ab-Tech Construc-
tion, Inc v United States,"' these courts have held that a submission
97 See, for example, Pogue I, 914 F Supp at 1509-13 (giving an extended discussion of all
FCA claims brought to date based on the Anti-Kickback and Stark laws, and concluding that the
prevailing view is that a violation of either may constitute a violation of the FCA).
98 Hopper v Anton, 91 F3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir 1996) (holding that a school district's gen-
eral assurances that it would comply with applicable federal law pertaining to special education
programs did not support a claim under the FCA).
99 Thompson v Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 125 F3d at 902 (stating that where the
government's payment of Medicare claims is conditioned on compliance with the anti-kickback
statute and the Stark law, plaintiffs correctly-allege a violation of the FCA). See also Gublo v
Novacar, Inc, 62 F Supp 2d 347, 355 (D Mass 1999) (holding that "if payment of Novacare's
Medicare or Medicaid claims ... was conditioned on Novacare's false certifications .. then plain-
tiffs properly allege a violation of the FCA"). But see Roy, 914 F Supp at 1506 (describing the
connection between violations of the FCA and the fraud and abuse laws as a "tenuous" one, but
still allowing the suit to survive the summary judgment stage).
100 42 USC § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (imposing penalties of up to $25,000 and five years imprison-
ment for violating the anti-kickback provisions); 42 USC § 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (imposing fines of
$15,000 per claim submitted in violation of the Stark law and imposing a $100,000 fine for
schemes to evade the Stark law).
101 31 Fed Cl 429,433-34 (1994) (finding that the submission of progress payment vouchers,
which represented an implied certification of Ab-Tech's continued adherence to federal re-
quirements, constituted false claims under the FCA).
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creates an "implied certification" that the claim meets the require-
ments of all federal laws and regulations.0 Courts imply that the de-
fendant has complied with the requisite health care laws and regula-
tions from the submission of a claim, since as a matter of law the de-
fendant should have complied with them in order to receive funding.0
There is a significant amount of disagreement over the implied
certification theory, ' with many courts rejecting the theory alto-
gether.0' Especially in the context of the Anti-Kickback and Stark
laws, mere technical violations of rather lengthy statutory require-
ments could lead to liability based on implied certification." Further-
more, commentators argue that violation of a health care regulation
does not necessitate the government's refusal to pay the particular
claim and that therefore the claim is not false.0 Under the Anti-
Kickback law, HHS has some discretion about whether to terminate
funding after a regulatory violation is discovered, '  and often over-
looks such a violation.'O' Even now the government may choose to ex-
102 31 Fed CI at 434. See also Shaw v AAA Engineering & Drafting Inc, 213 F3d 519,531-33
(10th Cir 2000) (permitting FCA liability based on implied certification in the submission of
monthly invoices).
103 Pogue 1, 914 F Supp at 1509, 1513 (finding plaintiff's implied certification argument suf-
ficient to survive a motion for summary judgment). See also Robert Fabrikant and Glenn E.
Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the
Health Care Industry, 51 Ala L Rev 105, 148 (1999) ("The false certification cases ... rest on the
proposition that the provider ... certified in its claims for reimbursement that it had provided
the care at issue in a manner consistent with the prevailing standards of care.").
104 See, for example, Fabrikant and Solomon, 51 Ala L Rev at 149-56 (cited in note 103)
(arguing against the use of the implied certification doctrine in the healthcare context); Rabecs,
2001 Detroit Coil L Rev at 63-68 (cited in note 87) (discussing FCA liability based on "implied
certifications" of compliance with the anti-kickback statute when medicare reimbursement
forms do not require express certifications with this statute).
105 Joslin v Community Home Health of Maryland, Inc, 984 F Supp 374,384 (D Md 1997)
("To hold that the mere submission of a claim for payment, without more, always constitutes an
'implied certification' of compliance with the conditions of the Government program seriously
undermines [the theory of the FCA].").
106 Fabrikant and Solomon, 51 Ala L Rev at 151 (cited in note103) ("[T]he healthcare in-
dustry is so heavily regulated that providers and suppliers neither know nor understand, and
cannot reasonably be expected to know and understand, all of the laws and regulations that gov-
ern their operations:').
107 John T. Boese and Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False
Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 Ala L Rev 1, 46 (1999) (arguing that because the
government has discretion in enforcing the anti-kickback statute, a violation may not result in an
obligation to repay the government and hence is not actionable under the FCA).
108 HHS must now exclude those convicted of committing felonies relating to financial mis-
conduct after August 21, 1996. See 42 USC § 1320a-7(a)(3) (1994). Nevertheless, FCA claims
were brought before the 1996 amendment when enforcement under the Anti-Kickback law was
still discretionary.
109 Boese and McClain, 51 Ala L Rev at 43 (cited in note 107):
[T]he DHHS has excluded hundreds, perhaps thousands, of healthcare providers for viola-
tions of the AKA. In no published case, however, has the DHHS or the DOJ ever filed an
FCA case seeking FCA damages amounting to retroactive recovery of all the federal funds
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empt a practice that may be a technical violation of the law."" If the
government would have been willing to pay the claim despite the
regulatory violation, it is difficult to see how the purpose of the FCA
would be furthered by allowing the suit.'
In response to these concerns, some courts have limited the Ab-
Tech implied certification theory of liability to instances in which the
regulatory violation is at the heart of the certification,' '2 or in which
compliance with regulations or other legal provisions is expressly re-
quired as a precondition for payment."' In both cases, the limitation is
based on the premise that the FCA only covers cases in which the
government would have changed its decision to pay the particular
claim if it possessed the information revealed in the suit. This standard
parallels the principle that mere technical violations of regulations do
not make a claim false for purposes of the FCA."4 For instance, in
Luckey v Baxter Healthcare Corporation,"' the court concluded that
even though the defendant was required to meet regulations prescrib-
ing the standard of care for laboratory work, compliance with these
regulations was not material to receiving payment from the govern-
ment and hence noncompliance was not actionable."'
Similarly, in Mikes v Straus,'" the court held that implied certifica-
tion applied to a statute that required the amount of a Medicare pay-
ment to include only services that were reasonable and necessary,
since the statute explicitly stated that a service not meeting this stan-
dard was not eligible for payment.H8 On the other hand, the court re-
fused to allow an additional claim based on an implied certification
that were paid to the newly-excluded provider.
Enforcement of the Stark law is not discretionary. See 42 USC § 1395nn(g)(1) (providing that no
payment shall be made for a designated health service provided in violation of the Stark law).
110 Dayna B. Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The Law, Economics, and
Ethics of Fighting Medical Fraud under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 Ind L J 525,540 (2001).
111 The purpose of the FCA is to "protect the federal treasury." Pogue 1, 914 F Supp at 1513.
For a general discussion, see S Rep No 99-345 (cited in note 48).
112 Luckey v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 2 F Supp 2d 1034,1044-45 (N D Ill 1998) (declining to
find that Baxter breached an implied certification in part because "unlike Ab-Tech, there is no
evidence that Baxter's practice violated the heart of its agreement with the government").
113 Siewick v Jamieson Science and Engineering, nc, 214 F3d 1372, 1376 (DC Cir 2000)
("Courts have been ready to infer certification from silence, but only where certification was a
prerequisite to the government action sought.").
114 Lamers v City of Green Bay, 168 F3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir 1999) (stating that public con-
fusion caused by new bus routes and city's trouble providing clear maps were minor technical
violations normal for a new bus program and did not give rise to an FCA claim).
115 2 F Supp 2d 1034,1034 (N D 111 1998).
116 Id at 1044-45. See also Thompson, 125 F3d at 902-03 (rejecting the implied certification
theory, but allowing the suit to continue on the theory that there was an express certification of
compliance with the applicable regulations).
117 274 F3d 687 (2d Cir 2001).
118 Id at 700-01, discussing 42 USC § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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theory under a different statute that required a physician to assure
that his services would meet the required standard of care in order to
be eligible for funding. " Noting that this latter requirement was a pro-
spective requirement for participation in Medicare rather than a pre-
condition of payment, and noting that violation of this section did not
mandate nonpayment of the claim, the court held that there was no
implied certification with respect to this section.In
3. Scienter requirements.
Interestingly, many courts have failed to address the FCA's sci-
enter requirement when discussing violations of the fraud and abuse
laws. This is not a problem for suits alleging violations of the Anti-
Kickback law, since to establish such a violation the defendant must
have acted with the same level of intent required by the FCA. There is
no scienter requirement, however, for violations of the Stark law. Thus,
to allow a violation of the Stark law to constitute a per se violation of
the FCA would essentially be to ignore the scienter requirement of
the FCA 2'
Furthermore, it is not clear that an individual who submits a claim
in violation of the fraud and abuse laws would know that his claim is
false if he is unaware of the existence of those laws, calling into ques-
tion the implied certification doctrine. While ignorance is not a de-
fense for violations of the fraud and abuse statutes themselves, it
might be a defense for violation of the FCA.22 The court might alter-
natively conclude that ignorance of the fraud and abuse laws them-
selves, or the belief that one was in compliance with them, was reck-
less and therefore actionable under the FCA. This is unlikely, however,
given the complex nature of the laws.'2
119 Mikes, 274 F3d at 701-02 (discussing the plaintiff's reliance on 42 USC § 1320c-5(a)
(1994)). See also Fabrikant and Solomon, 51 Ala L Rev at 122-24 (cited in note 103)
(distinguishing between conditions of participation and conditions of payment).
120 Mikes, 274 F3d at 701.
121 See, for example, Joslin, 984 F Supp at 384 (registering concern with an interpretation of
the FCA that would allow a plaintiff to show that the individual did not meet regulatory re-
quirements without showing the requisite scienter).
122 Id at 384-85 ("While ignorance of the law is usually no excuse to justify one's actions,
the FCA requires that a false statement be made with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or
reckless disregard of the statement's falsity.").
123 Robert Salcido, The Government Unleashes the Stark Law to Enforce the False Claims
Act: The Implications of the Government's Theory for the Future of False Claims Act Enforce-
ment, 13 Health Lawyer 1, 3 (Aug 2001) (noting that the Stark law is "so vague that it require[d]
several rounds of rulemaking spanning more than a half dozen years and yet the government still
has not arrived at a definitive conclusion regarding the proper scope and interpretation of the
statute," and arguing that it is unfair to charge defendants with "knowing and understanding the
full scope of the statute such that they are subjected to treble damages and civil penalties for
breaching the Act's undefined terms").
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE FCA TO SUITS AGAINST IRBs
Until now, only two suits have been brought by the government
alleging violation of the FCA with respect to federally funded human
subjects research."' This is not surprising, given the paucity of claims
against IRBs and universities with respect to human subjects research
in general. Furthermore, in the majority of the few cases that have
been brought, plaintiffs have generally relied on the tort system to
provide a remedy. This Part argues that the FCA may allow a prefer-
able cause of action in certain cases. Using the cases discussed in Part
I as illustrations, this Part also discusses how courts should analyze the
FCA cause of action and resolves some of the issues raised in Part II.
This Part will show that a suit under the FCA alleging violations of the
Common Rule will only be successful if three conditions are met: (1)
the government, specifically OHRP, is not aware of the violations; (2)
the violations are substantive, material to the government's decision
to fund, and not merely technical; and (3) the IRB knew that the re-
search violated the federal regulations or was reckless in applying
them, in effect "rubber stamping" the research protocol.
A. The FCA Provides an Attractive Cause of Action against an IRB
While a tort suit against an IRB alleging negligence in the fulfill-
ment of its duties would be attractive in many cases, there are in-
stances in which a tort suit would not be viable and in which the FCA
may provide for higher damages. First, the plaintiff need not have suf-
fered personal injury in a suit brought under the FCA; all that is re-
quired is the submission of a false claim. Thus, in instances where it
would be difficult to prove causation or that the plaintiff suffered
damages (both requirements of a typical tort suit), the FCA may pro-
vide the only way for a plaintiff to sue. For instance, as in the Robert-
son case, the plaintiff may not have suffered any physical injury,n so it
would be unclear how the improper oversight by the IRBs injured the
plaintiff and whether a tort suit would lie. In that case, however, as-
suming that the actions uncovered by OHRP are true, the IRB should
face some repercussions. While sanctions normally are issued by
OHRP, this is not always the case, especially in instances where there
is no injury to capture OHRP's attention.
124 Zissler v Regents of the University of Minnesota, 154 F3d 870,875 (8th Cir 1998) (finding
states to be "persons" under the liability provisions of the FCA and remanding for proceedings
on the plaintiff's claim of misuse of federal funds in an organ transplant research program);
Chandler v Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, 35 F Supp 2d 1078,1080 (N D Ill 1999) (deny-
ing the defendant's motion to dismiss a claim filed under the FCA for misconduct in implement-
ing a federally funded study of drug-dependent pregnant women). See text accompanying notes
32-37.
125 See note 38 and text accompanying notes 33-38.
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Furthermore, the FCA could allow a plaintiff who was not even
involved in the research to sue on behalf of the federal government.
Again considering the Robertson case, the nurse who uncovered the
negligence on the part of the IRB would not be able to sue under the
tort system because she was not harmed by the IRB's allegedly poor
oversight. She could, however, sue under the FCA. Thus, the FCA suit
against the IRB has unique benefits because it is in society's interest
to encourage the nurse to come forward with information. This en-
couragement is exactly the goal of the qui tam provisions of the FCA.
The award under the FCA might also be greater than that given
by the tort system. First, the damages can be trebled in certain circum-
stances.'2 More importantly, the defendant is also liable for between
$5,000 and $10,000 per false claim filed.'9 If a relator were to identify a
systematic violation of the federal regulations by an IRB that resulted
in many false claims being filed, the relator could stand to receive a
generous award even when limited to his statutory share of 30 per-
cent.' 8
B. The Policy Implications of Suits against IRBs Are Mixed
While a suit under the FCA may have benefits over a tort suit for
a litigant, several commentators have questioned the wisdom of allow-
ing suits against an IRB. Most have expressed concern that allowing
IRB members to be held liable would make their participation on the
IRB less likely.' This concern, however, is mitigated because the re-
search institution sponsoring the research, or the researcher himself,
could always indemnify IRB members in the event they are sued un-
der the FCA.'-9 Furthermore, it would seem in the interests of the insti-
tution to provide indemnification to assure the existence of an IRB,
126 31 USC § 3729(a).
127 Id.
128 Rabecs, 2001 Detroit Coil L Rev at 29 & n 72 (cited in note 87) (noting that the civil
penalties imposed by the FCA can be disproportionate to the actual damages suffered by the
government); Boese and McClain, 51 Ala L Rev at 19 (cited in note 107) (discussing the possibil-
ity that an extra charge of $1.00 for a laboratory test would only generate $1,000 in damage to
the government if there were 1,000 such tests, but that the civil penalties could be as high as $10
million).
129 Anderlink and Elster, 29 J L Med & Ethics at 225 (cited in note 5) ("Given our experi-
ence with IRBs, we believe that the prospect of being hauled into court whenever a clinical trial
goes badly will likely discourage those who are most qualified (typically those who have the
most to lose) from participating on an IRB."); National Commission for the Protection of Hu-
man Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report and Recommendations: Institu-
tional Review Boards 85, DHEW Pub No (OS) 78-008 (GPO 1978) ("[S]ome people may not
serve on an IRB if they know that they risk suit.").
130 See, for example, Ruth Scheuer, Research in the Hospital Setting on Human Subjects:
Protecting the Patient and the Institution, 60 Mt Sinai J of Med 391, 393 (1993) (suggesting that
research institutions require the researcher to indemnify the institution and its employees as a
condition of conducting research at the institution).
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since IRBs are the only vehicle through which it can receive govern-
ment funding for research involving human subjects.
The other problem with allowing FCA suits is overdeterrence.
IRBs, fearful of a lawsuit, might be too cautious in approving research
and withhold authorization for valuable research that does, in fact,
comply with the federal regulations. Overdeterrence could result re-
gardless of whether the institution indemnified the members of the
IRB; faced with FCA or negligence claims, the institution may pres-
sure the IRB to be more meticulous in its approval of research. The
problem of overdeterrence is compounded because IRBs are already
overburdened with the amount of research they must approve.'3' Any
increase in the amount of time spent approving research would come
at the expense of approving fewer research protocols or requiring the
creation of additional IRBs, raising the costs of the human subjects
protection system. The potential costs are also increased because, as
previously noted,'" damages may be trebled and the IRB could be li-
able for $5,000-$10,000 per claim filed. These costs could put addi-
tional strain on the system and would, especially in the case of medical
drugs and devices, ultimately be passed on to the consumer.
These added costs, however, must be weighed against the benefit
of allowing such suits. While trivial suits that do not affect the protec-
tion afforded human subjects research would not be sufficiently bene-
ficial to outweigh the costs to the system, it is conceivable that suits
under the FCA might improve human subjects protection in ways the
tort system cannot. For instance, while the tort system only addresses
failures of the system that harm an individual, FCA suits could reach
instances in which the protections were inadequate but did not result
in physical harm. This is important for two reasons. First, OHRP is
unlikely to be cognizant of such lapses. With limited resources, OHRP
rarely conducts investigations of IRBs,'3 and is likely to do so only if it
has reason to suspect problems with the institution's human subject
protections. Generally, OHRP only becomes aware of these lapses
when a human subject has been injured and the injury is reported by
the media. By allowing a suit under the FCA, a plaintiff could bring
the alleged problems to OHRP's attention or allow for an alternative
means of sanctioning an ill-functioning IRB. While an individual might
contact OHRP in the absence of the FCA, as the nurse in the Robert-
131 George Grob, Deputy Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspection, HHS, Institu-
tional Review Boards:A System in Jeopardy, statement before the Subcommittee on Human Re-
sources of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (1998) (noting a 42
percent increase in research protocols approved by an IRB over a five-year period).
132 See text accompanying notes 126-28.
133 OHRP, Protecting Human Research Subjects, 2, OEI-01-97-00197 at 2 (Apr 2000) (noting
that between June 1998 and March 2000, OHRP only conducted ten on-site investigations).
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son case did, many employees (who like the nurse would be in the
best position to know of violations of the federal regulations) might
be afraid to come forward for fear of reprisal.'" Finally, society should
want the problem -with IRBs to be reported and corrected before an
injury; the legal system should not wait until after a fatality to fix the
problem.
As a matter of policy, then, FCA claims should be encouraged in-
sofar as they affect substantive provisions of the human subjects pro-
tection system. Those lapses that are more likely to go unnoticed are
particularly attractive candidates for an FCA suit. Finally, there should
be some balance between the desire to use monetary damages as an
incentive to follow the regulations on one hand and the desire to
minimize additional costs to the system on the other.
C. The Required Elements of an FCA Claim Could Be Met
In order to state a claim under the FCA, the relator or the gov-
ernment must show that (1) a claim for payment was submitted to the
government; (2) the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) the defen-
dant knew or should have known of its falsity. 5 Furthermore, a relator
must also show that he did not rely on publicly available information
or that he is an original source of that information. While whether a
claim under the FCA would be successful is highly fact-dependent, in
the right circumstances a suit could be brought.
1. An IRB causes a claim for payment to be submitted.
The primary purpose of an IRB is to evaluate research to ensure
that it meets the requirements of federal funding. Without the ap-
proval of the IRB, the government would never expend funds on the
research protocol in question. By certifying that the research meets
federal guidelines, the IRB has made a statement or created a report,
the purpose of which is to get a claim paid or approved by the federal
government. ' Although the IRB itself does not receive funding, who
actually receives the money is irrelevant for purposes of the FCA.m7
134 S Rep No 99-345 (cited in note 47) (describing the experience of an individual who was
faced with either losing his job or keeping quiet as to falsifying time cards, and noting that fear of
reprisal was the second most cited reason for not reporting false claims).
135 See text accompanying note 55.
136 31 USC § 3729(a)(2).
137 Boese, Civil False Claims § 2.07[A] at 2-184.2 (cited in note 55) ("Courts have found a
defendant liable for 'causing' another to submit a false claim even if this defendant neither seeks
nor obtains federal funds on his own behal').
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2. A claim submitted by the IRB could be false or fraudulent:
application of the implied certification doctrine.
By approving research that is in violation of the federal regula-
tions, the IRB would be both presenting false information and causing
a fraudulent claim to be submitted to the government. For instance, if
an IRB knew that a researcher was not properly obtaining informed
consent, to approve the research and thus impliedly certify that the re-
search meets federal regulations would be to make a false statement.
Consequently, the claim submitted to the federal government, which
must comply with the federal regulations in order to be paid, would be
fraudulent.
In effect, any research that was approved but that violated the
federal regulations could present an actionable claim under the FCA:
by approving research, the IRB impliedly certifies that the research
meets federal guidelines for funding. Courts have been reluctant,
however, to allow claims to proceed under an implied certification
theory, fearing that technical violations would become a basis for li-
ability." Courts have also feared that the implied certification theory
fails to recognize that defendants may not fully understand the regula-
tions at issue and that the government may not have made a funding
decision based on the false or fraudulent information contained within
the claim. To avert these possibilities, courts have limited implied cer-
tification claims to those that are based on a material violation or
those that are required as a condition of government funding.
a) The implied certification doctrine. An implied certification the-
ory is needed to prosecute most healthcare fraud."' Because part of
the purpose in amending the FCA was to reach healthcare fraud more
effectively, ' ° it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended some
sort of implied certification theory. Courts should, however, limit the
breadth of the implied certification doctrine to instances in which the
violation of the regulations would have been material to a govern-
ment decision to fund the research.'4' This limitation is consistent with
congressional intent, because Congress intended to "recover losses
sustained as a result of fraud against the government."'42 If the gov-
ernment would have funded IRB research with knowledge of techni-
cal violations of federal regulations, it is difficult to see why the suit
would fulfill the purpose of the FCA. Indeed, it is generally the case
that the federal government would continue to fund research; OHRP
138 For a detailed discussion of implied certification, see Part II.B.2.
139 Rabecs, 2001 Detroit Coil L Rev at 4 (cited in note 87).
140 See Part III.B.
141 See notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
142 S Rep No 99-345 at 1 (cited in note 48) (emphasis added).
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rarely suspends federal funding of human subjects research, 3 and
usually does so only when violations have been found that threaten
the welfare of human subjects. Furthermore, the clear weight of au-
thority supports some restriction on the broad view of the doctrine set
forth in Ab-Tech."
Limiting implied certification to violations that would have
changed the funding decision would also accord with the judicially
imposed requirement of materiality in proving a violation of the FCA
statute itself.' While there is no materiality requirement in the text of
the FCA, courts have reasoned that only false statements or claims
that would have influenced the decision of the government should be
actionable under the FCA.46 If courts are willing to overlook nonma-
terial false statements as de minimis infractions or to hold that non-
material statements lack a necessary element of causation, it is diffi-
cult to imagine why they should not overlook the failure of an IRB to
comply with technical requirements of the federal regulations that are
nonmaterial.
Requiring that a violation of the federal regulations be material
in order to allow an implied certification claim also makes sense as a
matter of policy. As noted above, allowing any suit against the IRB has
negative consequences that should be weighed against the benefit
gained from allowing the suit.'47 If courts were to allow FCA suits
based on technical violations of the federal regulations, it is difficult to
see what value this would have for human subjects protections. Gen-
erally, if the violation is based on a technical requirement, human sub-
jects are not endangered by the violation. In addition, government
funding has not been lost or improperly spent since the government
would, if the court were to hold that the violation was not material,
have funded the research anyway. For instance, while OHRP cited the
Hopkins IRB that approved the protocol at issue in the Roche case
143 OHRP, Protecting Human Research Subjects, 2, OEI-01-97-00197 at 2 (Apr 2000) (noting
that between June 1998 and March 2000 OHRP suspended federal funding at only seven re-
search institutions, despite the increase in on-site investigations during the same period).
144 Richard J. Webber, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of False Claims Act Liability: Im-
plied Certifications and Materiality, 36 Procurement L 14,15 (Vinter 2001).
145 Berge v Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 104 F3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir
1997) (holding that "[i]f previously unclear, we now make explicit that the current civil False
Claims Act imposes a materiality requirement" and deciding that false statements made to the
NIH in support of a research grant proposal were not material and therefore not actionable un-
der the FCA). But see Cantekin v University of Pittsburgh, 192 F3d 402, 415 (3d Cir 1999) (sug-
gesting that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 23 n 7
(1999), might argue against a materiality requirement).
146 Harrison v Westinghouse Savannah River Co, 176 F3d 776, 785 (4th Cir 1999) (noting
that materiality depends upon "'whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence
agency action or is capable of influencing agency action"'), quoting Berge, 104 F3d at 1459.
147 See Part III.B.
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for failing to keep minutes of the IRB meetings, M it is difficult to see
how this imperiled the safety of human participants or affected the
decision of the government to fund the research. On the other hand,
the alleged failure to gain a sufficient knowledge of the facts necessary
to weigh the risks and benefits properly could result in harm to sub-
jects and would be considered a material violation.
Furthermore, liability based on technical violations could cause
IRBs to focus more heavily on ensuring that technical requirements
are met at the expense of duties that more directly impact human sub-
jects protections. While the technical requirements of the federal regu-
lations should not be minimized, other mechanisms, such as oversight
by OHRP, are in place to ensure those requirements are met. Finally, if
the technical violation was one that was present in all of the IRB's ap-
provals, such as a failure to maintain written records of its meetings, a
relator could recover $5,000-$10,000 per research protocol ap-
proved.' 9 As noted, the costs of the claim should be proportional to
the gain to the system in allowing the suit. Since the costs grow expo-
nentially with the addition of each claim, and since these technical vio-
lations do not appreciably affect human subject protections, this is not
a desirable result.
In addition to requiring that the regulatory violation be material,
some courts have held that the statute must explicitly require that the
regulatory guidelines be met.'" Even if a jurisdiction does limit the
implied certification doctrine in this way, it is clear that meeting the
requirements of the federal regulations is indeed explicitly required
by law to receive funding for human subjects research.'5 ' Therefore,
while not all of the provisions of the federal regulations may be rele-
vant to a governmental decision to fund research, compliance with the
regulations in general certainly is.
b) IRBs are familiar with the requirements of the federal regula-
tions. One reason courts have been unwilling to imply certification is
the fear that the defendant did not know or understand the require-
ments of the regulations upon which the FCA suit was based. '5 ' Mem-
bers of the IRB, however, are expected to be much more familiar with
the regulations governing human subjects research, both because the
regulations are much less extensive than the Anti-Kickback and Stark
148 See text accompanying notes 39-42.
149 This assumes, however, that courts do not require that a relator prove actual damages to
the government. See text accompanying notes 67-74.
150 See notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
151 42 USC § 289(a) (1994); 45 CFR § 46.103(a) (requiring that institutions engaged in fed-
erally funded research involving human subjects file written assurances that they will comply
with the terms of the federal regulations).
152 See note 105.
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laws and because the application of the regulations is their particular
province. Therefore, there is less fear that someone could be held i-
able based on an arcane, highly technical regulation. Even the more
technical requirements of the federal regulations of HHS are rela-
tively straightforward, and the IRB could request the assistance of
OHRP in their interpretation. In any event, members of IRBs, who
undergo training by HHS in how to apply the federal regulations,'S'
should be knowledgeable in the application of the Common Rule.
3. The scienter requirement.
In most cases, it might be difficult to prove that an IRB has sub-
mitted a false claim with the requisite scienter. While IRBs may be
negligent in failing to adhere to the federal regulations, it is probably
rare that they purposefully violate them.'m Thus, in most cases an FCA
claim based on actual knowledge would not be successful. There are,
however, exceptions to this general rule. For instance, in Grimes v
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc,' the IRB, in an apparent attempt to get
around federal regulations discouraging the use of children as control
groups, suggested that the researcher include language indicating that
the children were actually receiving some therapeutic benefit' As the
court noted, however, the change in wording did not affect whether
the research actually had any therapeutic value for the children in the
control group; the change was aimed at aiding "researchers in getting
around federal regulations designed to protect children used as sub-
jects in nontherapeutic research.' ' 7 It seems as though the IRB knew
that the research did not actually meet federal guidelines, but never-
theless approved it for federal funding. While this may be an extraor-
dinary case, it nevertheless illustrates that there are instances in which
IRs may meet the requisite scienter requirement under the FCA.
A plaintiff may also be able to show that the IRB was reckless in
the application of the federal regulations. While commentators have
urged against the use of the recklessness standard in the context of the
Anti-Kickback and Stark laws, both of which are extremely complex,
that complexity does not exist in this situation. Furthermore, as noted
153 OHRP, Federalwide Assurance of Protection of Human Subjects, available online at
<http'Johrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjectslassurance/filasurt.htm> (visited Feb 8, 2002)
(strongly recommending that IRB chairpersons complete training modules designed by OHRP
to ensure that they are familiar with the federal regulations and that other IRB members un-
dergo "relevant educational training").
154 See generally Grob, Institutional Review Boards: A System in Jeopardy (cited in note
131). While most commentators agreed that the system was in need of reform, most praised the
performance of IRBs under the circumstances.
155 366 Md 29, 782 A2d 807 (Md App 2001).
156 782 A2d at 814.
157 Id.
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previously, IRBs have greater expertise in this area. For instance, in
the Roche case, OHRP concluded that Hopkins failed to consider
adequate information to determine the relative values of risk to the
human subjects. Not only would this failure be material and thus meet
the requirements of the implied certification doctrine, such a showing
by a plaintiff in an action under the FCA might also be sufficient to
show recklessness, since in other contexts the defendant's failure to
gather adequate information to support a claim of payment was held
to be reckless. While courts should not second-guess the IRB's rea-
soned determination that a particular protocol is sufficiently safe and
valuable to warrant federal funding, a judicial determination that the
IRB was reckless in failing to consider sufficient facts to make such a
determination does not present the problem of a court's substituting
its judgment for that of the IRB.
Courts should be sure to follow the admonition of Joslin v Com-
munity Home Health of Maryland, Inc,"' and require that plaintiffs in
a qui tam action prove the requisite scienter. Even if the IRB did vio-
late the federal regulations, IRB members should not be held liable
unless they knew that they were submitting a false claim or were reck-
less in not knowing.
Furthermore, the scienter requirement leaves IRB members the
discretion to approve research. If courts apply a strict liability stan-
dard in determining IRB liability, courts could substitute their judg-
ment for that of the IRB and conclude that the IRBs improperly cal-
culated the risk of the research, that the consent forms were improp-
erly worded, or otherwise disagree with matters normally left to the
IRB's discretion. Insofar as IRBs are better able to apply the Com-
mon Rule, this is an undesirable outcome.
4. Amount of damages.
In FCA cases in which the regulatory violation would have af-
fected the government's decision whether to fund the research, the
amount of damages due the government would be relatively straight-
forward. In most instances, the actual damages would be the money
the government paid as a result of the claim. Here, that amount should
be the research grant. The government would then be entitled to three
times that amount, plus $5,000-$10,000 per claim.
If, however, courts do not adopt the materiality restriction on the
implied certification doctrine, and allow claims to go forward in which
158 984 F Supp 374,384-85 (D Md 1997) (declining to follow Ab-tech and stating that "while
ignorance of the law is usually no excuse to justify one's actions, the FCA requires that a false
statement be made with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of the
statement's falsity").
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the government would have funded the research notwithstanding the
false claim, it may be difficult to show what damages were caused. For
instance, if the IRB failed to keep written records of its meetings, but
the research would have been approved by the government anyway,
there would not seem to be any pecuniary loss to the government.
While most courts would treat the $5,000-$10,000 per claim penalty as
a sort of liquidated damages provision, courts that require proving ac-
tual damages as an element of the FCA might not allow a suit based
only on technical violations.
5. Jurisdictional issues.
As discussed previously, if a relator relies on public information,
the court generally lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the FCA
claim.'S9 In the IRB context, if a relator relies on a report filed by
OHRP, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.
Indeed, most courts require that the information be released in one of
the sources explicitly mentioned in the statute"O when deciding
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction,'6 although an OHRP
report would certainly qualify as an administrative report and thus
could potentially raise the jurisdictional bar.
In addition, it is probable that the elements of fraud would be in-
cluded in the OHRP report:'6 that the IRB did not adhere to the fed-
eral regulations and that it improperly approved research that was
funded by the federal government. Both of these were detailed in the
OHRP report of the Johns Hopkins research.u Inclusion in the
OHRP report of the critical elements of the fraud would count as a
public disclosure for purposes of the FCA, depriving the court of ju-
risdiction.
While most research subjects would probably not have sufficient
information as to the workings of the IRB that approved their re-
search project to bring a suit without the benefit of an OHRP report,
159 See Part II.A.4.
160 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A) (including a "criminal, civil or administrative hearing.. con-
gressional, administrative or Governmental Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investi-
gation .... [and] the news media" as potential sources).
161 Williams v NEC Corp, 931 F2d 1493,1499 (11th Cir 1991) (finding that the methods of
"public disclosure" set forth in 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A) are exclusive of the types of public dis-
closure that would defeat jurisdiction under that section); LeBlanc v Raytheon Co, 913 F2d 17,20
(1st Cir 1990) (holding that the only allowable forms of public disclosure are those outlined in
the statute); Phipps v Comprehensive Community Development Corp, 152 F Supp 2d 443,453 (S
D NY 2001) (stating that the first part of a two-part test for determining if a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is to determine whether the "allegations or transactions" on which the qui
tam action is based were publicly disclosed in one of the manners listed in the statute).
162 See notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
163 Letter from Patrick .McNeilly (cited in note 40).
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others associated with the IRB might be classified as an "original
source" and be able to file suit.' For instance, in the Robertson case, a
nurse familiar with the study brought the improper activities of the
IRB to the government's attention.'6 OHRP eventually issued a re-
port detailing those activities and concluded that they did in fact vio-
late the federal regulations. The nurse met the requirements of an
original source notwithstanding the OHRP report: she had direct and
independent knowledge of the IRB's actions without the OHRP re-
port and she disclosed the information to the government. Thus, she
could have brought a qui tam action, the OHRP report notwithstand-
ing. The public disclosure bar would not apply in her case, or others
like it, if a suit were brought under the FCA.
CONCLUSION
The False Claims Act provides a viable cause of action for those
seeking to sue an IRB for a violation of the federal regulations gov-
erning human subjects research. Although varying interpretations of
the FCA will determine which claims are actionable, some claims
could be successful even under the most conservative interpretation.
The most difficult barriers to overcome in bringing an FCA suit are
showing that the IRB knew it was approving research in violation of
the federal regulations, or was reckless in granting its approval, and
that the relator did not rely on publicly available information in bring-
ing the suit. Furthermore, courts should adopt an interpretation of the
FCA that requires that the violation be material to the government's
decision, both to avoid the possible requirement that actual damages
be shown and to prevent disproportionately large awards under the
penalty provisions. Nevertheless, because a plaintiff does not have to
prove the same kind of injury required by the traditional tort suit, a
claim based on the FCA may present an attractive option to the po-
tential litigant. Finally, in these limited circumstances, the use of the
FCA may promote a high level of protection of human subjects of
biomedical and behavioral research in the United States.
164 See notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
165 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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